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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES ON LOCAL ENFORCEMENT,
CRIME AND POLICING EFFICIENCY

Alberto Ciancio

Petra Todd
Camilo Garcia-Jimeno
Following a period of increasing immigration enforcement under George W.
Bush’s administration, the Obama administration reversed immigration policies and
issued strict new guidelines to relax enforcement in 2011. The purpose of this paper
is to exploit this natural experiment in the enforcement of the immigration laws to
study the effects of federal immigration policies on local enforcement, crime and
policing efficiency. I use a unique and new data set obtained through a Freedom of
Information Act request on several steps of the deportation process. I estimate how
the drop in federal immigration enforcement affected county level enforcement, local
crime rates and policing efficiency. My empirical analysis suggests that Democratic
counties complemented federal policies, by reducing their immigration enforcement,
whereas Republican counties tended to maintain higher levels of enforcement and
to not react much to the guidelines. Employing a triple-difference approach, I find
that Democratic counties with higher non-citizen population shares saw greater increases in clearance rates, a measure of policing efficiency, with no increase in crime
vi

rates. The results indicate that reducing immigration enforcement did not increase
crime and rather led to an increase in policing efficiency, either because it allowed
police to focus efforts on solving more serious crimes or because it elicited greater
cooperation of non-citizens with police.
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1

Introduction

‘When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best ...
They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing
those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing
crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”
Donald Trump, June 16, 2015

Immigration policy is central to political debates in the United States and in
many European countries. During the 2016 US Presidential campaign, President
Donald Trump proposed strong measures intended to stem the flow of immigrants
and to reduce the undocumented population. These measures included building a
wall on the southern border with Mexico, drastically increasing the number of deportations and reducing access to employment and welfare benefits for undocumented
immigrants. His opponent the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, favored a
path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants and excluding some categories of
undocumented immigrants from deportation.
One reason politicians focus on immigration is an assumed causal relationship
between immigration and crime. Those in favor of strong immigration enforce1

ment argue that because immigrants commit a disproportionate number of crimes,
removing criminal aliens should be a top priority. Those favoring a more lenient approach believe that strong immigration enforcement is counterproductive, because
it diverts law enforcement resources from fighting more serious crimes and makes
immigrants less likely to cooperate with the police.
These disparate beliefs regarding immigration manifest themselves through variation in local governments’ enforcement of immigration laws. In the US, selfdeclared sanctuary cities such as San Francisco protect undocumented immigrants
from deportation and guarantee limited access to health care and other social services. In contrast, Sheriff Arpaio of Maricopa County, Arizona gained notoriety for
his workplace immigration raids. Because local governments choose their own levels
of immigration enforcement, they can impede implementation of federal immigration policy.

1

The goal of this paper is to measure the effect of federal immigration policies on
local enforcement, crime and policing efficiency. As a source of exogenous variation
in immigration enforcement, I use a 2011 policy change that drastically reduced
non-border deportations in the US. These non-border deportations typically start
with an arrest by a local police officer. Officers of the federal immigration agency,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), can then communicate to the local
enforcement agency that they want to take the arrestee into custody by issuing
1

For example, several bills have been proposed in Congress to defund sanctuary cities. In the
opposite direction, in May 2012, the Justice Department under the Obama Administration sued
Sheriff Joe Arpaio for racial profiling.
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a so-called detainer. After receiving a detainer, the local enforcement agency in
charge of jails, usually the county’s Sheriff office, chooses whether the arrestee is
expediently transferred to ICE custody to be later deported.
Following a period of increased enforcement under the George W. Bush administration, the trend was reversed when, in 2011, the Obama administration issued
guidelines to relax enforcement. This was done partly to appeal to Hispanic voters
in the run-up to his re-election campaign. These guidelines prioritized deportations
of individuals representing an imminent threat to the country. The number of removals from the interior of the US peaked in 2010-2011 and then fell to about 30%
of their 2010 level by the end of 2015. Some counties went further to walk back
enforcement by passing “no detainer” ordinances designed to limit cooperation with
ICE. In practice, this meant ordering the sheriff to stop handing over detainees to
the federal authorities unless the detainees had committed serious crimes.
In this paper, I evaluate the effects of the 2011 reversal in immigration policy
on county-level immigration enforcement, crime and policing efficiency. In so doing, I use a difference-in-difference as well as a triple difference methodology that
exploits county characteristics to determine which counties are most affected by the
policy change. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, I obtained unique
data gathered under the Secure Communities program for the period 2008 to 2014.
This program required fingerprints of arrestees that are sent to the FBI to also be
shared with ICE. ICE can then cross-reference the fingerprints with information in

3

their immigration database and detect potential illegal immigrants. The dataset
includes monthly deportations at the county level along with information on the
deportation process, between the arrest by the local enforcement agency to the final
removal. The Secure Communities dataset is particularly useful because it enables
the construction of a continuous and consistent measure of enforcement, namely the
share of non-citizen arrestees that end up in ICE custody, in each jurisdiction over
time. As described below, I decompose this enforcement measure into components
due to local enforcement and those due to federal enforcement. I measure federal
enforcement using the issuance of detainers while I measure local enforcement using the share of detainers that end up in ICE arrests. I supplement the data with
monthly crime and clearance rates from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report as well as
with county characteristics from the Census and the American Community Survey.
I aggregate the data into quarters. The merged dataset enables examination of
the impact of immigration enforcement on crime and on clearance rates, the number of crimes cleared by an arrest, a standard measure of policing efficiency in the
criminology literature.
Using this unique data, I first document changes over time in county level enforcement and explore how enforcement relates to county characteristics. I find
that both federal and local enforcement dropped significantly after the issuing of
the Obama guidelines. However, counties reacted differently depending on preferences for immigration. My empirical analysis finds that Democratic counties

4

complemented lenient federal policies, by reducing their immigration enforcement,
whereas Republican counties tended to maintain higher levels of enforcement and
to not react much to the guidelines.
To analyze the effects of the Obama guidelines on crime and policing, I first use
a difference-in-difference approach comparing counties with different percentages of
non-citizens before and after the change in policy. I use the non-citizen share of the
population within counties as a proxy measure for the potential impact of the policy change with the assumption that the policy should have no effect on crime and
policing outcomes in places with very few immigrants (e.g., Montana) and potentially strong effects in places with a large immigrant community (e.g., Los Angeles).
I find that the relaxation of immigration enforcement in 2011 had no effect on crime
levels or crime rates but had a small positive effect on clearance rates. My results
also show that a one standard deviation increase in non-citizen share increases clearance rates for violent crimes by nearly 1%. This difference-in-difference analysis,
however, does not take into account how county-level characteristics, such as the
share of Democratic voters, affect the level of enforcement. Therefore, I employ a
triple-difference framework to incorporate these characteristics. I find that counties
with higher non-citizen population shares in more Democratic counties saw greater
increases in clearance rates, my measure of policing efficiency, but experienced no
significant change in crime. I also find that for a one standard deviation increase
in non-citizen share, moving from a county with the lowest to the highest share
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of Democratic voters would increase the clearance rate for violent crimes by 3.5%,
approximately 6.1% percent of the 57.1% average clearance rate for violent crimes.
For identification in the triple-difference analysis, I assume that for a given
increase in non-citizen share, there would not have been differential changes in
trend between Democrat and Republican counties without the Obama guidelines.
By implementing an event study around the policy change, I provide evidence in
favor of the parallel trend assumption by showing that, for a given increase in
the non-citizen share, the Democratic share does not predict differential trends in
clearance rates before the guidelines were issued.
I examine the robustness of the results to a number of factors, including changes
in economic conditions, changes in the size of police department, other changes in
immigration enforcement at the state or local level, and different ways of subsampling the data to create a common support between the treatment and control
groups. Finally, I supplement the baseline analysis of the federal policy change by
examining the effects of the California Trust Act, implemented in January 2014.
This state law forced California counties to restrict their cooperation with ICE to
include only immigrants guilty of serious crimes. Using a triple difference analysis,
I find that, similar to the Obama guidelines, the Trust Act increased clearances and
had no effect on crime. Following implementation of the Trust Act, a one standard deviation increase in the share of non-citizens in California counties raises the
clearance rate by 3.9 percentage points relative to unaffected states.

6

This paper has two key findings. First, I show that tougher immigration enforcement does not reduce crime and appears instead to make the job of the local
police harder, as reflected by the lower clearance rates in my results. Second, this
paper explores how political considerations affect the implementation of immigration policy. I find that the impact of the policy can be heterogenous depending on
county characteristics. The results underscore the importance of considering how
local authorities will respond to federal policies in determining overall enforcement
levels and the policies impact on county level outcomes. In particular, when local
and federal preferences are aligned, the effect of federal policies is amplified.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the
literature. Chapter 3 provides the institutional background of the deportation process and the policy change. Chapter 4 describes the data. Chapter 5 outlines the
hypotheses of the project. Chapter 6 details the estimation strategy and the results. Chapter 6 presents the aforementioned robustness checks. Chapter 7 offers
the summary and conclusion.

7

2

Literature

The relationship between immigration and crime is gaining importance in the literature, although existing empirical evidence is still scant. Examining at Italian
provinces, Bianchi et al. [2012] find no significant impact of immigration on overall
crime rates except for an increase in the incidence of robberies. Bell et al. [2013]
examine immigration in the UK. They find a positive effect of immigration on property crime rates when looking at asylum seekers but no effect when considering the
inflow of workers in 2004 from the rest of the EU. Pinotti [2014] uses a regression discontinuity design to show that legal status has a significant impact on the
propensity to commit crimes. Baker [2015] analyzes the legalization of undocumented immigrants in the US following the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control
Act and its effect on crime. He finds a strong decline in the number of crimes, particularly property crimes, which he attributes to greater labor market opportunities
for the newly legalized population. My research is most closely related to Miles and
Cox [2014], which analyzes the impact of the Secure Communities program on crime
rates. After controlling for county-specific linear time trends, they do not find that
the program has any significant effect on crime rates. While I utilize some of the
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same data, the focus of this paper differs, because I instead study the change in
immigration policy that occurred under president Obama as well as the legal change
under the California Trust Act.2
A growing body of research has examined the effects of recent local immigration
policies in the US. For example, Watson [2014] shows that deportations reduce the
welfare participation rates of both illegal and legal immigrants. Watson [2013] shows
that counties that enrolled in a special partnership with the federal government to
act directly as immigration officers experienced a drop in the immigrant population
by driving immigrants to more lenient counties rather than to their country of origin
as hoped by the promoters of such partnerships. Several other papers analyze the
effects of E-Verify, a national employment verification program, on the labor market
outcomes of undocumented workers (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak [2012], Bohn
et al. [2015], Orrenius and Zavodny [2015]) and the immigrant population (Bohn
et al. [2014]), by exploiting state laws that made the program mandatory for firms.
The literature on the political economy of immigration usually focuses on conflicts between the rich and the poor (Benhabib [1996], Mayda [2006]) or between
skilled and unskilled workers (Ortega [2005]). Skilled workers tend to be in favor of
low skilled immigration because their skills are complements to those of the immigrants. Native low skilled workers tend to be substitutes for immigrants and tend
to oppose immigration. However, they face a potential trade-off because they may
2

Also, in Miles and Cox [2014], they do not have precise information on the level of enforcement
prior to Secure Communities, while I can measure the change in enforcement following the policy.
Moreover, they cannot decompose local from federal enforcement.

9

benefit from more political power if low skilled immigrants become citizens and vote
for pro-worker policies. While immigration policy is usually studied at the national
level, I differ from the existing literature by showing the local level as well. From a
policy perspective, I show that the effects of federal and state immigration reforms
crucially depend on the reaction of local governments. For example, deferring removal action for some categories of undocumented aliens or restricting access to
welfare benefits may trigger an opposing reaction of local communities trying to
keep their desired amount of deportation intensity.
This paper is also closely related to the literature on the political economy of
law enforcement. Garcı́a-Jimeno [2016] analyzes the dynamics of law enforcement
during the Prohibition and is able to disentangle the explanatory power of the evolution of beliefs over the success of the law from the evolution of moral values in
the observed changes in Prohibition enforcement. Similar to my analysis, the local enforcement decisions are an essential determinant of the success or failure of
the federal policy. Casaburi and Troiano [2016] analyze the effects of a large antitax-evasion program on the reelection of incumbent mayors. They find significant
positive effects on reelection, particularly in areas with both lower tax evasion tolerance and higher efficiency of public goods provision, suggesting complementarities
among enforcement policies and civic capital. The methodology of this paper is
similar to that of Cascio and Washington [2014], which investigates the impact of
the Voting Rights Act on voter turnout and state transfers to black communities

10

using a triple difference estimator comparing states with literacy tests and shares
of the black population in different counties.

11

3

Background

In this section, I describe details of the deportation process, the historical context
that led to the policy change and the local reaction to the policy change. In the
United States, any non-citizen can be deported. By law, undocumented immigrants
must be deported because they do not have the legal right to stay in the country.
The majority of undocumented immigrants come from Latin America. They have
low levels of education and are more likely to be male (Passel and Center [2005],
Borjas [2017]). Hispanic immigrants, both documented and undocumented, were
initially concentrated in few states: California, Texas, Arizona, Florida, Colorado
and New Mexico. Recently hispanic immigrants moved to other areas of the United
States like North Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, New York and Illinois. The undocumented population grew substantially during the 1990s and early 2000s. It
stabilized after 2006 at around 11 million, or 4% of the US population. In addition,
non-citizen legal residents, can be deported if they commit what US immigration
law defines as an aggravated felony. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides
a list of aggravated felonies that includes violent crimes but also non-violent offenses
such as counterfeiting and theft or burglary if offender is sentenced to at least one
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year in prison.3 .
Deportations may include both individuals apprehended at the border by the
Customs and Border Protection and people already living in the US. Border removals consist almost entirely of people crossing the border from Mexico who are
immediately sent back. Deportations at the border drastically decreased from 1.6
million in 2000 to 340.000 in 2011. This decline is not due to lower enforcement,
which actually increased with more patrol agents deployed at the border, but is
merely the consequence of less people trying to cross the border. Conversely, the
majority of non-border deportations begin with the arrest of a non-citizen by a
local police officer. Subsequently, ICE can ask local officials to hold the identified
criminal alien in jail by issuing a detainer. Detainers are requests to the local enforcement agencies to hold the arrestee for 48 hours until ICE is able to pick them
up from jail. If the local enforcement agency cooperates with the request, then
the detainee will enter into ICE custody to be later removed. ICE has multiple
ways to know that there is a deportable alien in a local jail. Through the Secure Communities program, fingerprints of arrestees are sent to ICE which stores a
database of all non-citizens that have any previous encounter with the Department
of Homeland Security. This includes all the non-citizens legally in the US and all
the undocumented that overstay their visa, which is estimated to be around 50%
of all undocumented immigrants. Moreover, it includes all the undocumented that
illegally crossed the border and who have been captured at least once by the Border
3

https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-29/0-0-0-5684.html
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Patrol. Therefore, most undocumented individuals should be in the ICE database.
For the immigrants not in the database, ICE periodically visits local jails to conduct
one-on-one interviews with inmates that are suspected to be violating immigration
laws.
In the aftermath of 9/11, which shifted the focus of the Bush administration to
national security, interior removals of non-citizens increased both in absolute numbers and relative to the estimates of undocumented population. Removals peaked
during the first term of the Obama administration and then fell sharply after several policy changes were introduced in Obama’s second term. ICE deported 69,478
immigrants from the interior of the United States in 2015, down from 229,235 in
2010 (figure B.1). This fall cannot be attributed to a decrease in the undocumented
population which was roughly constant over this period. This implies some change
in policy must be responsible for the decrease.
Local jurisdictions played an important role in the surge of interior immigration
enforcement during the 2000s. The inability of Congress to pass comprehensive
immigration legislation because of political disagreements resulted in the proliferation of local immigration measures. These local measures were either supportive of
immigrants, as in so called sanctuary cities, or anti-immigrant, making it harder for
them to obtain employment, housing and welfare. Steil and Vasi [2014] find that the
Democratic share of votes in the presidential election of 2004 and education levels
are the main significant predictors of pro-immigrant local ordinances. An impor-
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tant predictor of anti-immigrant ordinances is latino population growth. During this
period, the federal immigration agency, known as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), introduced several partnerships with local enforcement agencies,
such as the 287(g) program, the Criminal Alien program and Secure Communities. The ability to access local jails simplified dramatically the task of identifying
undocumented people for deportation and potentially allowed ICE to focus on individuals who represented a threat to national security. The Secure Communities
program further eased the task of identifying removable aliens by automatically
sending fingerprints of arrestees to ICE. The enrollment in the Secure Communities program, contrary to the 287(g), was not optional for local governments and
was instead mandated by ICE. They gradually introduced the program county by
county, starting with the places with the highest concentration of immigrants.
Reflecting a shift in government priorities of the Obama administration, under
pressure from immigration advocacy groups, in June 2011 the ICE director issued
a memo to ICE agents, instructing them to prioritize deportation of criminal aliens
who represent a serious threat to national security.4 The memo particularly cites
to limited enforcement resources and thus to the need to prioritize deportations. In
practice, the result was a dramatic reduction in the number of immigrants deported
by ICE. In June 2012, a new memo from ICE explicitly stated that certain categories of undocumented immigrants would not be deported, in particular children,
protected by the introduction of deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA). Fi4

https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf
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nally in October 2014, President Obama, by executive order, deferred deportation
for other categories of the undocumented,. He introduced the Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), and replaced the
Secure Communities program with a new program called the Priority Enforcement
Program, which still sent fingerprints to ICE but acknowledged that cooperation of
local enforcement agencies is voluntary.
Despite these federal guidelines, in some cases ICE still sought the deportation
of immigrants that had committed no serious crime. Beginning in 2011, several
counties limited their collaboration with ICE to cases of serious crimes. In practice,
they released deportable aliens from jail before ICE could arrest them, unless they
had committed a serious crime. Sheriffs and county councils motivated these decisions with concerns regarding immigrants’ trust in the police and their cooperation
in criminal investigations. They also point to limited resources diverted to paying
for inmates on hold for ICE. For example, Cook County’s council in Illinois passed
an ordinance approving limits to cooperation with immigration authorities, stating
that

16

“...it costs Cook County approximately $43,000 per day to hold
individuals “believed to be undocumented” pursuant to ICE detainers,
and Cook County can no longer afford to expend taxpayer funds to
incarcerate individuals who are otherwise entitled to their freedom ...
... having the Sheriff of Cook County participate in the enforcement of
ICE detainers places a great strain on our communities by eroding the
public trust the Sheriff depends on to secure the accurate reporting of
criminal activity and to prevent and solve crimes...”
Cook County Board of Commissioners, September 7, 2011

The $43,000 per day translates into roughly 17 million dollars per year, a significant cost for the sheriff department. It is also clear from the language of the ordinance how ideological motivations further influenced the decision. Among the counties that passed similar ordinances, I find many counties are Democratic strongholds,
such as San Francisco, Santa Clara, Philadelphia and Washington. In figure B.2, I
show a map of the United States highlighting the counties that passed an ordinance
of similar intent from July 2011 to September 2014 at the end of my sample. More
policies have been passed after September 2014. It is clear that these policies are
concentrated in areas with high hispanic immigration and a strong presence of the
Democratic Party. County governments usually give the general rules regarding
local immigration enforcement, while the sheriffs make the day-to-day decisions.5
5

County governments have different structure. Depending on the US state, there is a board of
supervisors, a commission or a council.
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It is not unusual for sheriffs to disagree with the decision of the county government,
but they are forced to follow their guidelines.6
Decisions to limit collaboration with ICE were also driven by several court decisions that made counties liable for holding immigrants in jail when no crime was
committed, due to constitutional violations (Altis [2014]). These rulings implied
that a suspected immigration violation does not legally constitute a sufficient reason to imprison someone. Finally, there were changes at the state level. California
passed the Trust Act, which went into effect in January 2014. The law forced counties to limit their cooperation with ICE to serious crimes if they were not already
doing so.7

6
7

This is the case for example of Los Angeles.
A similar policy was also passed in Connecticut.
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4

Data

4.1

Enforcement

My empirical strategy requires data on deportations at the county level for multiple time periods. To obtain this information, I made a Freedom of Information Act
request to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and got access to monthly
deportations data at the county level for the period October 2008 to September
2014. These data are from the Secure Communities program which is a data interoperability system that automatically transmits information on arrestees to ICE.
Prior to its creation, fingerprints taken by Local Enforcement Agencies (LEA) were
routinely transmitted to the FBI for the purposes of conducting criminal background
checks. Under Secure Communities, these fingerprints are also checked against the
Department of Homeland Security’s Automated Biometric Identification System
(IDENT), which contains data on known immigration violators, known and suspected terrorists, criminal aliens and non-citizens subject to the US-Visit program.
Counties were gradually enrolled in the program starting from October 2008. All
counties were enrolled by January 2013. By June 2011, at the time of the policy
change, more than 70% of the US population was living in counties enrolled in
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the program. Consequently, I have an unbalanced panel of counties with up to 73
months and 3181 counties.
The data include the different steps of the deportation process:
1. A: local arrest
2. D: ICE decides whether to initiate deportation (detainer request)
3. C: ICE takes arrestee into custody if local agency allows
4. removal
Federal discretion plays a role in deciding whether to initiate deportation through
detainer requests.8 Local discretion plays a role by arresting the immigrant and
by deciding whether to honor the detainer request. The number of non-citizens
arrested is not an adequate measure of immigration enforcement because estimates
of the undocumented population are imprecise and there are many causes of arrests
that are unrelated to immigration status. Due to these shortcomings, I instead
consider the following measures:
• Total enforcement: C/A = ICE Custody / Local Arrests
• Federal enforcement: D/A = Detainers / Local Arrests
• Local enforcement: C/D = ICE Custody / Detainers
An advantage of using the Secure Communities dataset is that it allows me
to construct a continuous measure of enforcement for all counties in the US that
8

Federal discretion plays a role also in picking up the detainee. Even though they issued a
detainer and so they are interested in deporting the individual, because of limited resources they
may give up. However,I cannot separate federal efforts in picking up the detainee from local
collaboration. Therefore, I focus on detainers issued for federal enforcement.

20

varies over time. Previous studies relied on one time policies implemented in few
jurisdictions, while I am able to track the dynamics of immigration enforcement. In
addition to utilizing richer data, my measures of enforcement avoid issues common
in other papers. Fasani [2009] and Watson [2014] use total number of deportations
as their measure of enforcement. Even including various controls, total deportations
is likely to capture changes in crime levels. By focusing on what happens after the
arrest, I am able to avoid the problem. My dataset is particularly useful in this
capacity because it contains all of the steps of the deportation process. This allows
me to separate local enforcement from federal enforcement.
One way to obtain the response of counties is to use the county ordinances that
limit cooperation with detainers. I retrieve these “no detainer” policies from the
Immigrant Legal Resource Center website and I use them as an alternative measure
of local enforcement. The language of such ordinances is not sufficient to predict
their impact on enforcement. By using Secure Communities data, I can measure
the extent to which these laws decrease enforcement. Examining a small number
of these counties, I find that local enforcement often drops after an ordinance is
passed, but, in some cases, I do not observe any change in enforcement following a
no-detainer policy.9
One difficulty with my proposed measures stems from the time between arrest
and entering into ICE custody. Arrestees should first serve the sentence for which
9

For example the ordinance in Philadelphia in 2014 only marginally reduced the share of
detainers not in ICE custody.
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they are taken into custody by the local police. It is not clear that this is always
the case or if the arrestee can be handed over to ICE prior the end of the judicial
process and conviction. In the data, I find an immediate change in enforcement
after the Obama guidelines and also find a sudden decrease in local enforcement
of several counties after passing a ”no detainer” policy. A possible explanation for
this rapid reaction of enforcement to the policy change is that most immigrants
are arrested for minor violations such as traffic violations or solely immigration
violations.10 Moreover, the dataset allows me to focus the analysis on less serious
offenses which require less time in jail.
Another issue is that only a small fraction of counties was enrolled in Secure
Communities before the Obama guidelines. Early adopters are likely to have different characteristics than other counties. Cox and Miles [2013] analyze the correlates
of early enrollment in Secure Communities. They find that the most relevant county
level explanatory variable is the share of the population that is hispanic. They also
reject the hypothesis that Secure Communities was first activated in counties favorable to strict immigration enforcement. I perform a similar analysis and confirm
that Democratic share is not an important predictor of activation date after taking
into account the share of non-citizens and other control variables (table B.2). In the
empirical analysis, I use the entire sample of US counties as well as the restricted
sample of activated counties. I highlight when the restriction of the sample sample
makes a difference but generally the results are very similar.
10

TRAC [2013].
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By examining enforcement measures over time, I can observe the effects of the
policy changes. Figure B.3 shows that total enforcement drastically decreased after the first federal policy change was implemented in June 2011. The enforcement
measure in the graph is an average weighted by 2010 population of counties enrolled
in Secure Communities before May 2010, allowing for a consistent measure of enforcement over time. Federal enforcement mirrors the change in total enforcement,
while local enforcement drops only slightly after the policy and has a further strong
decrease after the California Trust Act and the court decision described in Altis
[2014].The measure of local enforcement is sometimes above 1, because, in some
cases, ICE takes a detainee into custody without issuing a formal detainer request.
11

Table B.3 shows the striking variation in federal enforcement across districts.

4.2

Crime and Clearances

When limiting coordination with ICE, counties give two main justifications:
1. Reluctance of immigrants to contact police in case, when they are the witness
or the victim of a crime
2. Detaining immigrants for ICE is costly and diverts resources from other
police duties.
These perceived effects may lower police efficacy. At the same time, critics of these
non-compliant policies claim that they reduce the deterrence of the Secure Com11

It is clear that the first federal policy change had a strong effect on enforcement while the
second guidelines did not seem to impact the trend. Therefore, in the rest of the paper I will
consider only the first federal policy change and the California Trust Act.
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munity program and therefore increase crime. One measure of police efficacy is
the clearance rate. The clearance rate measures the number of reported criminal
offenses that is cleared by an arrest (İmrohoroğlu et al. [2004], Mas [2006] and Paré
et al. [2007]). Clearance is a term used by the FBI and other reporting agencies to
describe when police have obtained enough evidence to arrest someone for a particular offense. If immigrants cooperate less with police, it may become harder to arrest
offenders. Moreover, diverted resources may decrease overall police productivity, by
limiting their focus to immigration violations. Using monthly data from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR), I construct a measure of the crime rate,
the clearance rate

clearances
.
crimes

crime
,
population

and

As shown in figures B.4 and B.5, these distributions

have a mass at zero and there are a few outliers from the median value. Therefore,
I replicate my results using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation with a less
skewed distribution (figure B.6 and B.7). In addition, I use yearly data from the
FBI on the number of police officers per capita to serve as an additional control.
The UCR covers violent crimes, including murders, manslaughters, rapes, robberies,
assaults, as well as property crimes such as burglary, larceny and vehicle theft. It
does not include traffic violations, driving under the influence or drug related crimes,
which constitute the majority of cited offenses. For the majority of detainees, there
is no offense cited other than an immigration violation.
One of the limits of the data is that the UCR uses reported crimes instead of
the actual number of crimes. This may be problematic for accurately measuring
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changes in crime because if undocumented immigrants are scared of contacting the
police, they will not only avoid serving as a witness but will also avoid reporting
crimes to the police. However, by focusing on crimes, like murders, where the
probability of police discovery is higher, I can lower the gap between reported
and actual crime. Moreover, if this is the case, it provides more evidence that
immigration enforcement makes police work harder. Unfortunately, there is also
well known measurement error in UCR data. To overcome this issue, I follow the
existing literature by imputing year estimates to quarters when needed (Maltz and
Targonski [2002]). Around 7% of the sample requires such adjustments.

4.3

County Characteristics

The empirical analysis requires exogenous cross-sectional variation between counties in terms of preferences for enforcement and the potential impact of the policy
change. I utilize several covariates that may be important determinants of preferences. To capture political preferences, I focus on the Democrat and Republican
share of voters from the 2008 presidential election from Dave Leip’s atlas of US
presidential elections (Leip [2012]). This may be relevant because the Republican
party has favored stricter immigration enforcement in recent years. According to a
2015 survey by the Pew Research Center, 71% of Republicans say immigrants in the
U.S. make crime worse, compared with just 34% of Democrats. Meanwhile, Republicans are half as likely as Democrats (24% vs. 55%) to say immigrants have almost
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no effect on crime. In alternative specifications of the empirical model, I include
the percentage of people voting Republican in the 2012 presidential election.
There are other characteristics of counties that may be important determinants
of attitudes toward immigration. As previously mentioned, several papers on the
political economy of immigration emphasize the importance of the conflict between
skilled and unskilled labor in shaping tastes given the different effects that immigration has on labor market outcomes of those groups (Mayda [2006]). Accordingly, I
consider education, specifically the share of the population with a bachelor degree,
to control for skill-related worker preferences. To represent labor demand, I look
at the sectoral composition of the economy and, in particular, the share of workers
in the service sector. Since firms’ recruiting needs may influence leniency of the
local governments toward immigrants, it is important to include this information.
Finally, I use a measure of how rural counties are from the National Center for
Health Statistics. The American Community Survey provides this information at
the county level as well as the non citizen share of the population by county using
a five years sample from 2006 to 2010. From the American Community Survey,
I also find the hispanic non citizen population share and use it as an alternative
measure of deportable aliens in a county with the justification that most of the
undocumented come from Latin America.
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5

Hypotheses

In this section, I characterize the strategic relationship between federal and local
enforcement and the channels through which they affect crime and policing. In the
appendix, I present a simple model that formalizes this discussion. There are two
ways in which local enforcement could react to a drop in federal enforcement. If federal and local efforts have some degree of technical complementarity in determining
the overall level of enforcement, then a fall in federal enforcement reduces incentives
for a local government that derives some utility from immigration enforcement to
invest in local enforcement. Alternatively, counties may instead increase local enforcement to compensate for a lower federal enforcement and to satisfy their own
preferences. Anti immigrant counties may be particularly risk averse and want to
avoid a substantial drop in total enforcement. If this is true, it would result in a
larger reduction of local enforcement in more lenient counties. More generally, preferences of local governments and the elasticity of substitution between federal and
local enforcement determine the degree of strategic complementarity and whether
the two efforts are substitutes or complements. Therefore, counties with disparate
characteristics, meaning different preferences, may react differently to the Obama
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guidelines.
Federal enforcement may vary by county and within ICE federal districts. One
reason for this is that it can strategically react to local enforcement. For example
federal officials may disinvest from counties that stop collaborating with ICE, because if a sheriff does not hand over certain immigrants, there is no point to issuing
a detainer request. Another source of variation is that ICE may prioritize certain
counties over others. They may care more about counties with certain characteristics, such as counties with more immigrants or those in urban areas. Even local
politics could potentially impact the investment priorities of the federal government
by encouraging contributions to more politically aligned constituencies. When the
ICE directives emerged, federal districts may further focus resources on these counties or uniformly reduce resources. In the absence of clear details on ICE goals and
procedures, ICE enforcement remains an empirical object.
Immigration enforcement may directly affect crime at least in two ways. First, it
deters immigrants from committing crimes in order to avoid being deported (Becker
[1968], Abrams [2012]). Second, it affects the size of the immigrant population, since
deportations actually remove people from the county. The latter may reduce the
crime level but has an ambiguous effect on crime rates depending on whether immigrants commit more crimes than natives. If immigrants have a higher propensity
to commit crimes than natives, crime rates should fall if immigration enforcement
decreases the immigrant population.
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Enforcement may also impact crime rates and levels by changing the ability of
the police to fight crime. Sheriffs and county supervisors that limited their coordination with ICE cited two motivations. One is that enforcement disrupts the
relationship between police and the immigrant community. In particular, fear of
contacting the police induces undocumented individuals to report fewer crimes and
to avoid serving as witnesses. This undermines what is known in the criminology
literature as community policing (Greene and Mastrofski [1988]). Second, immigration enforcement could divert the resources of law enforcement agencies from
fighting crime. Keeping inmates in jail solely for immigration violations is very
costly and may diminish resources available to patrol and arrest criminals.
Together, these two channels may reduce the probability of arresting those who
commit crimes. I can then test whether the reform had an impact on the county level
crime rates and clearance rates, or the ratio of crimes cleared by an arrest. When
studying at the effect of the policy on outcomes at the county level, I exploit the
fact that counties with a higher non citizen share should face a greater impact from
these policies. County level enforcement changes at different rates depending on
county preferences for immigration, which in turn depend on their characteristics.
The effect of the Obama guidelines should be greater among counties with higher
non-citizen shares and with characteristics that are associated with larger drops in
enforcement. In particular, I focus on the county share of Democrats, which is a
significant determinant of local policy changes in immigration.
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6

Empirical Analysis

6.1

Enforcement

The first objective of this paper is to analyze the heterogenous response of enforcement. to new federal guidelines. Then, I exploit variation in the local response to
analyze crime related outcomes. While describing the institutional background, I
highlighted that several counties decided to formally limit their cooperation with
ICE and that this occurred mostly in communities that tended to vote Democrat.
Therefore, I focus on the Democratic share of voters in the 2008 presidential election, as the primary source of heterogeneity.
I run the following regressions where total, local and federal enforcement are the
dependent variables and the policy interacted with county characteristics serve as
the explanatory variables:

Enforcementct = αc + αt + φ(Guidelinest × democratic sharec ) + γWct + ζct

where αc denotes county fixed effects, αt denotes time (quarter) effects and Wct
represents county specific time varying controls. Standard errors are clustered at
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the county level in order to control for autocorrelation in the error term ζct . In all
specifications, Wct includes dummies for the ICE federal districts and states interacted with time dummies to allow for the wide heterogeneity in federal enforcement
changes among districts and to measure the importance of local characteristics in
enforcement changes.
If the Obama guidelines generate a different reaction in heavily Democratic counties, more specifically causing them to reduce local enforcement to a greater extent
than Republican counties, the coefficient on the interaction between Guidelines
and Democratic share should be negative. Column (1) in table B.4 reports the basic specification with local enforcement and Democratic share interacted with the
policy. The relevant coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1%
level, indicating that Democratic counties had a larger reduction in local enforcement. The result is in line with the anecdotal evidence described earlier. While
this simple specification predicts this intuitive result , it may be the case that partisanship is not the relevant driver of local preferences after the addition of other
factors. Column (2) expands the analysis by introducing several county characteristics interacted with the policy change. In particular, I consider the non-citizen
population share, share of the population with bachelor degrees and a measure of
how rural the county is. A negative significant coefficient shows that Democratic
share is still a significant predictor of change in local enforcement and that the
other factors are not significant. The result implies that a one standard deviation
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increase in the Democratic share decreases the ratio of individuals in ICE custody
to total detainers by around 5%.
In columns (3) and (4) I perform a similar analysis for federal enforcement, that
is measured as the ratio of detainers over local arrests of non-citizens. The coefficient
for Democrat is not significant showing no evidence that federal districts offset
lower local enforcement in Democratic counties by increasing federal enforcement.
Finally, in columns (5) and (6) I analyze the effects on total enforcement which I
measure as the ratio of ICE arrests over local arrests of non-citizens. In both cases,
the coefficient for Democrat share is negative although significance is lost with the
extra controls.
In order to check that the results are not driven by outliers, as shown in table
B.5, I redo the analysis using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the
√
enforcement measures. This transformation corresponds to log(x + 1 + x2 ). With
the transformation, I find very similar results, implying outliers do not drive my
earlier results.
In the data section, I discussed concerns regarding the enforcement measures
I constructed. One of the concerns was the timing between local arrest and ICE
arrest. Another was that enforcement measures will be less comparable between
counties if the type of crimes for which the immigrants are arrested is very different
in different counties. To provide evidence that neither is driving my results, I restrict
the sample to non-serious crimes that have shorter jail sentences. Democratic share
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is still a significant predictor of local enforcement when only considering non-serious
crime, meaning I can dismiss these earlier concerns (table B.6).
All the results shown above are limited to counties enrolled in Secure Communities at the time of the policy. However, in the data section I provided evidence
that the Democratic share is not a significant predictor of the month of activation
in the program. I will also provide evidence that the results for crime and policing
are not affected by restricting the analysis to counties enrolled before the Obama
guidelines.
Finally, I look directly at the correlation between passing a no-detainer ordinance
and the Democratic share of voters. I measure the correlation by running a simple
OLS regression with a dummy for passing an ordinance regressed on the Democratic
share and other county characteristics. Results from table B.7 clearly show that
counties that passed no-detainer policies were disproportionally more Democratic.

6.2

Crime and Policing

In this section, I outline my approach to estimate the effects of the Obama guidelines
on crime and policing. Regressing outcomes on the measures of enforcement would
lead to misspecification. This is because there is an obvious endogeneity problem.
For example, an increase in crime may induce the local law enforcement agency to
attempt more deportations while an increase in efforts to fight crime may reduce
resources devoted to immigration enforcement. Another issue is that there is spu-
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rious correlation between enforcement and clearance rates because clearances also
include the arrests of immigrants. The first problem could be addressed by an IV
strategy by using an instrument constructed by interacting the policy change with
county characteristics. However, the spurious correlation between the dependent
and independent variables would create a non linear measurement error problem
that would seriously bias the estimates.
To avoid these issues, my initial empirical strategy exploits variation across
counties to determine different levels of treatment of the policy. I implement a
difference-in-differences approach using the variation in the non-citizen share of the
population. The idea is that immigration enforcement should only impact counties
with non-citizens. For example, deportations may impact crime in Los Angeles but
should have no impact in North Dakota. Our initial specification is

yct =αc + αt + β(Guidelinest × non citizen sharec ) + γWct + ζct

where y can be the clearance rate, the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of
the number of crimes or the crime rate and Guidelines is a dummy that is equal
to 1 after the policy decision. I include as controls, county and time fixed effects
as well as some time variant W which in the baseline specification are state and
federal district dummies interacted with time dummies. The sample consists of a
quarterly panel of all the US counties from October 2008, the start of the Secure
Communities program, to September 2014. I chose October 2008 as a start date to
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analyze the same period covered in the enforcement analysis and because it gives
roughly the same number of quarters before and after the Obama guidelines.
I first analyze the clearance rate for violent crimes. Column (1) of table B.8
reports the coefficient on the non citizen share as positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level. In column (2), I introduce extra controls interacted with the policy
change and find a positive coefficient of 0.24 significant at the 1% level. This
indicates that a one standard deviation increase in non-citizen share increases the
policy’s impact on clearance rates for violent crimes by nearly 1%. Columns 3 and
4 show results for clearance rates of property crimes. The effect on these rates is
smaller but still statistically significant. When analyzing crime, I show results for
levels of violent and property crimes in columns 5 to 8. The results do not find that
the policy has statistically significant effect. When I look at crime rates, I find that
the policy has negative effects, but these effects lose significance when I impose the
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. This implies the observed crime rate results
may be driven by outliers (table B.9). Therefore, my results provide no evidence
that the Obama guidelines increased crime and, if anything, they reduced crime.
There are multiple explanations for these results. It is possible that immigrants
commit few serious crimes thus limiting the deterrent effect of deportations. It is
also possible that better policing during this time helped to prevent crimes.
The enforcement analysis shows that there is heterogeneity in the change in
immigration enforcement among counties after the policy. Because county-level
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changes in enforcement will in turn impact crime, it is important to tease out this
heterogeneity to isolate the effects of the Obama guidelines on crime. Therefore, I
would like to incorporate this heterogeneity into the difference in differences analysis. I argued earlier that the Democratic share of voters is an important determinant
of change of immigration enforcement. The difference-in-difference generates the
average effect in Democratic and Republican counties. Then, I implement a triple
difference in difference strategy using the county-level Democrat share of voters in
the 2008 presidential election. The coefficient of interest is given by the triple interaction between the policy, non-citizen and Democrat share. I include an interaction
between Democrat and Guidelines to control for factors unrelated to the policy
that would lead to different outcomes for Democratic and Republican counties. Intuitively, this captures whether a difference in the non-citizen share has a greater
impact after the guidelines in places with higher Democratic share.
The first identifying assumption for my triple difference analysis is the parallel
trends assumption. That is, for a given increase in non-citizen share, there would be
no differential change in trend between Democrat and Republican counties without
the Obama guidelines. I will provide justification for this assumption with an event
study. The second identifying assumption is that there are no contemporaneous
events to the policy change that differentially affect the treatment and the control
group. I consider alternative explanations for my results in the robustness section.
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The main specification is

yct =αc + αt + β(Guidelinest × non citizen sharec ) + ψ(Guidelinest × democraticc )
+ φ(Guidelinest × democraticc × non citizen sharec ) + γWct + ζct

where y is clearance rate or crime rate and the coefficient of interest is φ.
Column 1 of table B.10 shows results for clearance rates of violent crimes. I
observe that the coefficient on the triple interaction is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. Column 2 shows results, when adding extra controls
and I find a coefficient of 1.1, significant at 1 percent (column 2). This indicates
that for a one standard deviation increase in the non-citizen share, moving from the
lowest to the highest Democratic share increases the clearance rate by 3.5 percentage
points, where the average clearance rate for violent crimes is 57%. This is the main
result. The drop in federal enforcement caused by the guidelines has a significant
positive effect on police efficiency in arresting criminals who commit violent crimes.
Column 3 shows the results for the clearance rates of property crimes. In this
case, the coefficient on the triple interaction is positive and significant but is about
one third of the coefficient for violent crimes. However, this finding is not significant while including the extra controls. The results suggest that immigration
enforcement has a larger impact on fighting violent crimes than on property crimes.
One possible explanation is that undocumented immigrants are more likely to witness violent crimes than natives because they live in neighborhoods with higher
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concentration of violent crimes.
I next check whether immigration enforcement has any effect on crime. If
crime disproportionally increases in Democratic counties with high proportion of
non-citizens, then there is evidence that immigration enforcement reduces crime.
Columns 5 and 6 in table B.10 show results for total number of violent crimes
and columns 7 and 8 show results for the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of
property crimes. Table B.11 shows that immigration enforcement has no significant
effect on crime levels or crime rates.
As mentioned earlier, I only observe reported crimes. The bias from not observing unreported crime leads to overestimation of the effects of enforcement on
actual crime. Because lower enforcement should increase reporting from undocumented immigrants, the estimate is an upper bound on the effects of enforcement
on crime. To provide evidence that the Obama policy did not in itself increase
crime, I redo the analysis with murders and manslaughters only since the reporting
problem should be less serious than that of other crimes. Again, I do not find a
significant effect when focusing only on these crimes, as shown in table B.12.
Another potential source of bias is that immigrants may react to a change in
enforcement by moving to other counties. For instance, suppose enforcement drops
in county A. This would draw criminals from county B to county A. leading to crime
increases in county A. In this case, I would underestimate the effect of enforcement
on crime and my estimates would be an upper bound of the effects of the policy-
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induced reduction in enforcement on crime. It is possible that the policy increased
crime and I do not observe that because I cannot capture the migration response.
However, given that I use only three years of data after the policy change, the
mobility response to the policy should be limited.

6.3

Mechanisms

My results show that immigration enforcement has a negative impact on police efficiency but I would like to determine whether this is due to increased collaboration
of immigrants with the police or to resources shifted from immigration enforcement
to policing. I have not found suitable data that describe collaboration of immigrants with the police. However, I have data on county expenditures on police,
justice and correction that may shed some light on the crowding out of resources
story. The data come from the Government Finance Database of Willamette University (Pierson et al. [2015]). It provides local government expenditures at the
county level extracted from census of government data. The data has three types of
expenditures important for this analysis: corrections, judicial and police. Immigration enforcement may increase correction expenditures because it is costly to hold
immigrants for ICE. It may increase judicial costs by causing increasingly frequent
lawsuits from holding non convicted immigrants in prison. I use the same triple
difference model I applied in my analysis of clearance rates to examine the effects of
the Obama guidelines on expenditures. I find mixed evidence. My results show that
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the policy has a significant positive effect on the log of current police expenditures
and a negative effect on the share of judicial expenditures (table B.13). I do not
find significant effects on correction expenditures, the share of police expenditures
or the log of judicial expenditures. A more in-depth analysis of county finances is
needed but I do find some evidence consistent with the theory that immigration
enforcement crowds out other policing activities.

6.4

Parallel Trends Assumption

For the triple difference approach to be valid, I need the parallel trends assumption
to hold. In a general discrete setting, this requires that the relative dynamics of
both the treatment and the control group would be the same in the absence of
the policy shock. Specifically, for a given increase in non-citizen share, the relative
dynamic of Democrat and Republican counties would be the same in the absence of
the policy change. This is crucial because otherwise the results may simply reflect
a pre-policy differential trend in unobservables between Democrat and Republican
counties given a certain non-citizen share. To test for such trends, I develop an
event study analysis with the following specification:

yct =αc + αt +

X

βτ (N oncitizenc × Ptτ ) +

τ

+

X

X

ψτ (Democratc × Ptτ )

τ

φτ (N oncitizenc × Democratc × Ptτ ) + ct

τ
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where Ptτ is a dummy equal to 1 if τ = t. In figure B.8, I plot estimates of the
coefficients φ. For the identification assumption to hold, the coefficient φ should
not be significantly different from zero prior to the policy. I omit the interactions
with the dummy for one of the quarters before the policy to identify the model.
The coefficient β captures the change in the gradient of clearance in non-citizen
share between the second quarter of 2011 and quarter τ for comparison (Republican) counties, while the sum β + φ captures that change for treatment (Democrat)
counties. The triple interaction term is a significant predictor of clearances only
after the Obama guidelines. No coefficient is significantly different from zero before
the policy and immediately after the policy, the coefficient becomes positive and
significant, entering in a new trend.

12

12

I am able to test whether the pre-policy coefficients are significantly different from one another.
The F test cannot reject the hypothesis that
H0 : φ−9 = φ−8 ... = φ0
with a p value of 0.46.
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7

Robustness Analysis

7.1

Specification Tests

In the previous section, I showed that the clearance rates for violent crimes increased
disproportionally more for high immigrant communities in relatively Democratic
counties. In this section, I test several specifications to verify that certain implicit
assumptions I do while running my main specification were appropriate. Table
B.14 shows different specifications for the triple difference analysis using clearances
of violent crimes as the dependent variable. Column 1 is the main specification
with county and time fixed effects, county specific linear time trends and state and
districts fixed effects interacted with time effects. In the previous section, I showed
that Democratic counties reduced more enforcement but the result was limited to
the sample of counties who were enrolled in Secure Communities prior to the Obama
guidelines. I already showed that Democratic share is not a significant predictor of
early activation in the program. Now I verify that the results hold when including
only counties already enrolled in Secure Communities prior to the Obama guidelines.
Doing so, the coefficient of interest is still significant and very close to that of the
baseline analysis.
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The baseline empirical model assumes the effect of the Democratic share of
voters is linear. Instead, it could be that a discontinuity arises when Democrats
have a majority of votes because then they can choose the county board and the
sheriff. One way to test for nonlinearities is to add the interaction of a dummy
for a Democratic majority with guidelines and an additional interaction with noncitizen share. I define a county as having a Democratic majority if the share of
Democratic voters in the 2008 presidential election was greater than the Republican
share. The coefficient on the triple interaction is significant and higher than in the
baseline model, suggesting a slightly lower elasticity for counties with Democratic
majorities. However, the coefficient on Democratic majority is negative and not
significant, suggesting non-linearities are not a relevant problem.
Another important concern is that Republican counties may not be valid comparisons for Democratic counties even after controlling for several other characteristics. First, I check that the two types of counties are comparable in terms of
non-citizen shares. After trimming the sample in order to get a common support
over non-citizen share between counties in the top quartile and the bottom quartile of the Democratic share, the results are unaffected. A related concern is that
the immigrant population may differ between Democratic and Republican counties. Then, the results may reflect that the counties have different compositions of
immigrants instead of reflecting local preferences. It could be, for example, that
only undocumented immigrants fear the police and that they are concentrated in

43

Democratic counties. Then, the greater effects of the policy observed in Democratic counties may be explained by them having a higher share of undocumented
immigrants given the same number of non-citizens. To show that this is not a major concern, I replicate the analysis using the hispanic non-citizen share instead of
the whole non citizen population with the logic that undocumented immigrants are
disproportionally hispanic. Again, the results are very similar to the baseline in
magnitude and statistical significance. As an additional check of the parallel trend
assumption, I show results including county specific linear time trends. The coefficient is similar to the baseline results and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Finally, because of the skewed distribution of the dependent variable, I present results using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation in the last column of table
B.14 . The results do not change when using this transformation.

7.2

Alternative Explanations

My results thus far suggest that the policy, by drastically reducing immigration enforcement, had a larger positive effect on clearance rates in counties with a higher
share of immigrants while its impact on crime did not differ based on the county
share of immigrants. However, other channels may have contributed to the differential change in clearance rates between counties. In this section, I consider
alternative explanations to these observations.
One predictor of clearance rates may be the number of police officers. To control
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for whether the aforementioned disparities are solely due to different numbers of
police, I introduce the yearly (log) number of police officers from the Uniform Crime
Report and find very similar results as shown in column 1 of table B.15. Economic
conditions may also be an important omitted variable that both affects enforcement
and crime. Local governments may change enforcement depending on the hiring
needs of firms (Fasani [2009]) or their unemployment levels. At the same time,
better economic conditions tend to reduce crime and can also affect the efficiency of
the police. The time period covered in my data coincides with the Great Recession,
further emphasizing the need to control for economic conditions in this analysis.
For this reason, I control for labor demand shocks using a Bartik shock at a yearly
frequency13 . The control is not significant and the coefficients of interest are similar
to the baseline, which confirms economic conditions are not driving my results.
A potential threat to identification comes from concurrent changes in immigration enforcement, particularly at the state level. In the last decade, state and local
governments were especially active in immigration policy. With Congress unable to
13

The idea is to use industry shares in a county and changes in employment (or wages) for the
different industries at the national level excluding that particular county. National levels are not
affected by a single county and interacted with industry shares of the county they are correlated
with changes in employment in the county. Therefore, it is a valid instrument for labor demand
changes and can be written as
∆Bc,t =

X

(log(Eind,−c,t ) − log(Eind,−c,0 ))

ind

Eind,c,0
Ec,0

where period 0 can be considered the year before the start of the sample so the 2008. I construct
this measure using several years of the ACS which provides a repeated cross-section of individuals
with information on employment, industry and location. The lowest geographical unit is an area
called PUMA and for several individuals I need to impute the county using the population share
of county in a PUMA provided by the Census crosswalk.
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pass comprehensive reforms, states passed laws restricting employment (AmuedoDorantes and Bansak [2012]), driver licenses, in-state tuition and access to welfare.
Municipalities also passed several ordinances regarding immigration, mostly in the
period around 2006. I collected all these policies which I may use as controls. A
policy of distinct importance to our context is the 287g agreement between ICE and
local or state governments which allowed local law enforcement to directly enforce
immigration law. Los Angeles and San Bernardino enrolled in the program in 2005
and subsequently 66 other counties joined the program. The Obama administration
ended a portion of these agreements at the end of 2012 and they are no longer in
effect.
With regards to concerns about state-level policies, I already include state effects interacted with time effects in my baseline model. However, the effects of the
policies may be heterogenous within states. In column 3 of table B.15, I introduce
as additional control the (log) number of firms enrolled in the E-Verify program.
This program enables firms to electronically check the legal status of the employees. Column 4 introduces an interaction between having a 287g agreement and the
dummy for periods after the guidelines to see if the termination of these agreements
affect my results. However, since most of the 287g agreements operated in counties
leaning Republican, if anything we should see a stronger reduction in enforcement
in Republican counties which goes in the opposite direction of my results. In both
specifications, the results are not substantively affected (table B.15). If anything,
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the coefficient on the triple interaction is slightly greater which indicates that the
reaction of the counties to the federal program is even greater once we take into
account the end of the 287g program.

7.3

California Trust Act

So far, I have analyzed the impact of the Obama guidelines to understand how
federal and local enforcement interact as well as their effect on several county-level
outcomes. To further explore these phenomena, I analyze the impact of a similar policy, the California Trust Act, which intended to reduce local immigration
enforcement. Before the law was implemented in January 2014, several counties
already decided to limit their compliance with ICE, especially those with a long
history of sanctuary city status, while many other counties continued to fully cooperate with ICE. Pressure from the Latino voters convinced Democratic Governor
Brown to sign the law on October 5th 2013, after vetoing a similar measure in 2012.
Intuitively, one would expect the Trust Act to have a similar impact to that of the
federal guidelines in reducing enforcement. STherefore, it would be reassuring to
show that it lead to a similar impact on crime and policing as the federal policy.
Table B.16 shows the effects of the Trust Act on local enforcement, crime and
clearances. I first include a simple dummy for the policy, leading to the following
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specification:

yct =αc + αt + ψ(P ostt × Californiac ) + γWct + ζct

where I include the extra controls and the county specific linear time trend but
remove district fixed effects to achieve identification. I also add Democrat and
non citizen share interacted with time to control for the fact that California has
more immigrants and leans Democrat. The sample used in this analysis consists of
quarters after the Obama guidelines, since there was likely a differential change in
trend between California counties and the rest of the US after the guidelines.
From the results in column (1), it is clear that the policy had the intended
effect of reducing local enforcement. The number of detainers that actually become
ICE arrests significantly dropped in California compared to the rest of the US.
Federal enforcement did not decrease (column 2), while total enforcement dropped
following the local enforcement changes (column 3). Analyzing police outcomes,
the clearance rate for violent crimes increased by 7.8% while the clearance rate for
property crimes increased by 3% compared to what would have happened without
the Trust Act. The policy does not seem to have a significant impact on crime
levels or crime rates.
Next, I implement a triple difference framework to analyze the effects of the
Trust Act. I would expect it to have larger effects on crime and clearances in counties with higher non-citizen shares. My triple difference analysis has the following
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specification

yct =αc + αt + β(Guidelinest × non citizen sharec ) + ψ(Guidelinest × democraticc )
+ φ(Guidelinest × democraticc × non citizen sharec ) + δ(P ostt × non citizen sharec )+
+ λ(P ostt × Californiac × non citizen sharec ) + γWct + ζct

where the coefficient of interest is on the triple interaction between a dummy equal
to 1 for periods after the Trust Act, a dummy for counties in California and the
non-citizen share. In this specification, I use the entire sample starting from October 2008. Therefore, the equation includes the variables relevant to the Obama
guidelines in order to account for the changes in trends due to the guidelines.
Table B.17 shows that the results are qualitatively the same as the federal guidelines. When examining the clearance rate of violent crimes, the coefficient on the
triple interaction is 0.34 and statistically significant at the 1% level. After adding
extra controls, the coefficient is 0.296 and significant at the 5% level. This implies
that after the Trust Act, a one standard deviation increase in non citizen share
increases the clearance rate by 3.9 percentage points in California Counties. While
the impact on the clearance rates of violent crimes is substantial, I find no effect on
the clearance rates of property crimes nor on crime levels or crime rates.
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8

Conclusions

This paper studies the effects of immigration enforcement on crime and policing
using the variation generated by a policy change for the deportation process in the
United States that prioritized the deportation of dangerous criminals and precipitated a 70% fall in non-border removals between 2011 and 2015. Because the policy
provides a source of exogenous variation in federal enforcement, it allows me to analyze the strategic relationship between local and federal immigration enforcement
and their effects on crime and policing efficiency.
I find three main results. First, I find that Democratic counties had larger
reductions in local enforcement than Republican counties after the policy. Second,
using the Democratic share of voters as a proxy for variation in local preferences
for immigration and the non-citizen population share as a measure of the potential
impact of the policy, I find that there is no significant evidence that the guidelines
led to an increase in violent or property crimes. Third, when using the same method,
I find a positive effect on clearance rates, particularly for those of violent crimes.
These results indicate that reduced immigration enforcement did not increase crime
but rather led to an increase in policing efficiency. This could be either because
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it allowed police to focus efforts on solving crimes or because it elicited greater
cooperation of non-citizens with police. Data on police resources and on crime
reporting may shed light on which mechanism drives these results.
In addition, the results suggest that the degree of alignment between local and
federal preferences is essential in determining the overall level of enforcement and
therefore the real impact of federal policies. This is particularly relevant in the
US where multiple layers - county, federal district and national government - are
involved in the process. It is also potentially relevant in areas besides immigration.
The degree of decentralization and how that affects local outcomes is an interesting
avenue for future research. Another interesting future step would be to look at
the effects of local enforcement spillovers on neighboring counties. Migrants may
react to enforcement over time, relocating and thereby affecting local crime rates.
Furthermore, neighboring counties may react by changing their level of enforcement, leading to a strategic game between counties. My results show a degree
of substitutability between crime enforcement and pure immigration enforcement.
One natural future step would be to explore how shocks to a particular type of
enforcement have consequences on other types. In this case, lower immigration enforcement freed resources that may have been used to intensify arrests of certain
ethnic groups.
The policy implications of this work apply not only to the US but also to European countries, with the caveat that Europe receives mostly refugees who may be
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different than those who immigrate to the US. There is an ongoing debate worldwide on whether to create a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants or to
increase deportations. If reducing crime is the primary policy objective, increased
deportations may be sub-optimal.
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Appendices
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A

Enforcement Game

After the Obama guidelines, several counties started to limit collaboration with ICE.
In this section, I propose a framework where local governments strategically react
to changes in federal enforcement. The players of the game are the local government
and the federal district that both maximize deportations subject to a (monetary
and political) cost. In the model, federal and local enforcement contribute to deportations (total enforcement) with a certain degree of complementarity. The Obama
guidelines increase the cost of federal enforcement for the district thereby reducing
federal enforcement. Unless local and federal enforcement are perfect substitutes,
lower federal enforcement will decrease the returns from local enforcement. At the
same time, lower federal enforcement may induce local governments to substitute
and increase local enforcement to keep the desired level of deportations. In the
model, this willingness to substitute is determined by a risk averse parameter in the
utility of deportations.
Now I will formalize the model. Consider a Stackelberg game where the federal
district moves first and the local government moves second. Total enforcement d is
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the combination of local e and federal f according to a CES production function

1

d = (eρ + f ρ ) ρ

(A.0.1)

In the second stage, local government maximizes

max
e≥0

dθ
− C(e)
θ

(A.0.2)

where

θ = F (λX) ; F 0 (·) > 0

(A.0.3)

can be interpreted as a risk loving parameter (equivalent to CRRA) which increases
the elasticity of e with respect to f . It depends on county characteristics X.
In the first stage, federal district maximizes

max µd(e(f ), f ) − K(f, P )
f ≥0

(A.0.4)

where µ = ψZ is a preference parameter that depends on characteristics of the
county relevant for the decision of federal district but not for that of the local
government. P is a shifter of the cost of federal enforcement and represents our
federal policy change. I treat the Obama guidelines as an increase in P . Robust
comparative statics deliver the following result
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Proposition 1. Local enforcement e and federal enforcement f are strategic complement (substitute) if and only if θ > ρ (θ < ρ).
Moreover, ef is increasing in θ.
Thus, characteristics of the county determine the sign and the degree of complementarity. This result is intuitive. More risk averse counties (low θ) will tend to
substitute more whereas enforcement will be complement if the level of risk aversion
is sufficiently low with respect to the technical elasticity of substitution ρ.
Now, I consider comparative statics with respect to P .
• f is decreasing in P
• e is decreasing in P iff θ > ρ
• |eP | is increasing in X if λ > 0
In this specific context, I will treat the democratic share of voters as X. Then, local
enforcement will decrease relatively more in democratic counties if λ > 0.
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B

Tables and Figures

Table B.1: Summary statistics
Variable
Enforcement
Local: ICE arrests over detainers
Federal: detainers over non-citizen arrests
Total: ICE arrests over non-citizen arrests
County Characteristics
non citizen %
hispanic non citizen %
democrat 2008 presidential election %
democrat 2012 presidential election %
bachelor %
urbanization index
services %
Outcomes
clearance rate violent crimes
clearance rate property crimes
violent crimes per 100,000 people
property crimes per 100,000 people
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Mean

Std. Dev.

N

1.065
0.177
0.19

0.901
0.253
0.285

20220
33256
33256

0.027
0.019
0.415
0.384
0.201
0.624
0.599

0.036
0.031
0.137
0.146
0.089
0.485
0.079

3066
3065
3066
3066
3065
3066
3065

0.571
0.205
225.882
444.433

0.342
0.184
296.272
445.252

68469
69543
79713
79713

Table B.2: Predictors of Late Activation in Secure Communities
(2)
month activation
-6.487∗∗∗
(1.520)

(3)
month activation
-0.298
(1.720)

Bachelor

-12.297∗∗∗
(2.080)

-8.905∗∗∗
(2.111)

Services

6.454∗
(3.875)

0.772
(3.916)

Rural

4.050∗∗∗
(0.503)

3.586∗∗∗
(0.503)

Democrat

(1)
month activation
-11.163∗∗∗
(1.254)

-33.385∗∗∗
(4.472)

Non Citizen

Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

32.979∗∗∗
(0.682)
3065
0.587

29.174∗∗∗
(2.063)
3065
0.607

31.157∗∗∗
(2.062)
3065
0.613

Notes: The dependent variables is the month of activation in the Secure Communities program. Democrat is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the
2008 presidential election. Non Citizen is the share of non citizen in a county
measured with Census 2010 data. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population.
Other county characteristics include share of population with a bachelor degree,
share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors in
parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.3: Variation at Federal District Level in Federal Enforcement D/M
aor federal enforcement D/M
BUF
.06
BOS
.079
CHI
.085
NEW
.092
ELP
.096
SPM
.106
BAL
..106
DET
.113
MIA
.117
NOL
.118
NYC
.121
PHI
.126

aor
SLC
SND
WAS
DEN
SEA
ATL
PHO
SFR
HOU
LOS
DAL
SNA

federal enforcement D/M
.153
.16
.168
.169
.185
.203
.215
.229
.244
.264
.287
.389

D/M = detainers / local arrests of non citizen. Period 2013-2014
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Table B.4: Effect of Obama guidelines on enforcement

Democrat × post
Extra Controls
Observations

(1)
local
-0.428∗∗∗
(0.120)
17736

(2)
local
-0.399∗∗
(0.191)
X
17736

(3)
federal
0.010
(0.040)
28926

(4)
(5)
federal
total
0.043 -0.089∗∗
(0.043) (0.037)
X
28926
28926

(6)
total
-0.038
(0.046)
X
28926

Notes: The dependent variables are the local enforcement which is the ratio of ICE arrests over
detainers, the federal enforcement which is the ratio of detainers over immigrant arrests and total
enforcement which is the ratio of ICE arrests over immigrant arrests. post is an indicator equal to
one for months after the Obama guidelines. Democrat is the share of voters for the Democratic
Party in the 2008 presidential election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed
effects and federal district and state dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are
weighted by 2010 population. In column (2), (4) and (6) I include county-level controls interacted
with time dummies. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services
industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.5: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Enforcement (hyp transformation)

Democrat × post
Extra Controls
Observations

(1)
local
-0.285∗∗∗
(0.071)
13244

(2)
local
-0.288∗∗
(0.115)
X
13244

(3)
federal
0.007
(0.038)
21350

(4)
(5)
federal
total
0.039 -0.087∗∗
(0.041) (0.035)
X
21350
21350

(6)
total
-0.041
(0.043)
X
21350

Notes: The dependent variables are the local enforcement which is the ratio of ICE arrests over
detainers, the federal enforcement which is the ratio of detainers over immigrant arrests and total
enforcement which is the ratio of ICE arrests over immigrant arrests. I transform the variables
with inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. post is an indicator equal to one for months after
the Obama guidelines. Non Citizen is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census
2010 data. Democrat is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential
election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects and federal district
dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In column
(2), (4) and (6) I include county-level controls interacted with time dummies. Those include share
of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization.
Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.6: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Enforcement. Non Serious Crimes.

Democrat × post
Extra Controls
Observations

(1)
local
-0.338∗∗∗
(0.114)
16495

(2)
local
-0.346∗∗
(0.138)
X
16495

(3)
federal
0.028
(0.043)
27507

(4)
federal
0.046
(0.046)
X
27507

(5)
total
-0.049
(0.036)
27507

(6)
total
-0.045
(0.039)
X
27507

Notes: The dependent variables are the local enforcement which is the ratio of ICE arrests over
detainers, the federal enforcement which is the ratio of detainers over immigrant arrests and total
enforcement which is the ratio of ICE arrests over immigrant arrests. Guidelines is an indicator
equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. Non Citizen is the share of non citizen in
a county measured with Census 2010 data. Democrat is the share of voters for the Democratic
Party in the 2008 presidential election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed
effects and federal district dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by
2010 population. In even columns, I include county-level controls interacted with time dummies.
Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a
measure of urbanization. Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.7: Correlation Local Policies and Democratic Share of Voters

Democrat

(1)
nodetainer
0.373∗∗∗
(0.027)

(2)
nodetainer
0.232∗∗∗
(0.029)

Non Citizen

0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)

Rural

-0.013
(0.008)

Services

-0.047
(0.058)

Bachelor

0.366∗∗∗
(0.050)

Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

-0.107∗∗∗
(0.012)
3067
0.057

-0.093∗∗∗
(0.032)
3063
0.147

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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64

64824
0.837

X
64824
0.837
65695
0.728

0.023
(0.051)
X
65695
0.731

0.080
(0.053)

72093
0.620

-1.400
(1.878)

0.296∗∗∗
(0.090)

0.236∗∗∗
(0.091)
X
72093
0.622

-2.308
(1.952)

(6)
violent
crimes

72093
0.587

-2.138
(2.184)

X
72093
0.590

-3.064
(2.312)

(7)
(8)
property property
crimes
crimes

Notes: The dependent variables are the clearance rate for violent crimes which is the ratio of clearances (arrests) over
reported crimes, clearance rate for property crimes and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformations of violent and property
crimes. post is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. NonCit is the share of non citizen in a
county measured with Census 2010 data. Democrat is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential
election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects, and federal district and state dummies interacted
with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In even columns, I include county-level controls interacted
with the guidelines dummy. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a
measure of urbanization. Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Extra Controls
Observations
Adjusted R2

NonCit × post

(5)
violent
crimes

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
clearance clearance clearance clearance
property property
violent
violent

Table B.8: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Policing and Crime
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63081
0.962

X
63081
0.962

(2)
viol
-346.80∗∗∗
(124.72)

63081
0.939

(3)
prop
-678.87∗∗
(304.94)
X
63081
0.939

(4)
prop
-866.71∗∗∗
(313.17)

63081
0.757

(5)
hyp viol
-0.780
(1.291)
X
63081
0.757

(6)
hyp viol
-1.417
(1.331)

63081
0.725

(7)
hyp prop
-1.553
(1.508)

X
63081
0.726

(8)
hyp prop
-2.232
(1.575)

Notes: The dependent variables are violent and property crimes per capita. Columns 5 to 8 present results for the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformations of the crime rates. post is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines.
NonCit is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. In all the specifications, there are county
and time fixed effectsand federal district and state dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by
2010 population. In even columns, I include county-level controls interacted with time fixed effects. Those include share of
population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors clustered
at county level in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Extra Controls
Observations
Adjusted R2

NonCit × post

(1)
viol
-271.89∗∗
(122.66)

Table B.9: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Crime Rates
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1.000∗∗∗
(0.359)
X
64478
0.838

1.105∗∗∗
(0.362)

NonCit × Dem × post

65348
0.728

0.179
(0.300)

0.013
(0.049)

-0.117
(0.165)

-0.02
(0.314)
X
65348
0.731

0.025
(0.042)

0.065
(0.184)

71637
0.954

-205.8
(960.8)

6.6
(44.4)

-142.4
(548.2)

(5)
violent
crimes

-67.1
(979.5)
X
71637
0.955

-15.3
(45.6)

-283.4
(579.0)

(6)
violent
crimes

71637
0.931

842.9
(2153.6)

-46.4
(95.8)

-1188.9
(1250.4)

(7)
prop
crimes

1273.0
(2226.9)
X
71637
0.933

-85.0
(99.0)

-1625.1
(1358.5)

(8)
prop
crimes

Notes: The dependent variables are the clearance rate for violent crimes which is the ratio of clearances (arrests) over reported
crimes, clearance rate for property crimes and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformations of violent and property crimes.
post is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. NonCit is the share of non citizen in a county
measured with Census 2010 data. Dem is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election.
In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effectsand federal district and state dummies interacted with time
dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In even columns, I include county-level controls interacted with
time fixed effects. Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of
urbanization. Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

64478
0.837

-0.081∗∗
(0.036)

-0.104∗∗∗
(0.035)

Dem × post

Extra Controls
Observations
Adjusted R2

-0.255
(0.241)

-0.340
(0.238)

NonCit × post

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
clearance clearance clearance clearance
property property
violent
violent

Table B.10: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Policing and Crime. Triple Difference
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X
62682
0.962

-67.1
(979.5)

-15.3
(45.6)

(2)
viol
-283.4
(579.0)

62682
0.939

842.9
(2153.6)

-46.4
(95.8)

(3)
prop
-1188.9
(1250.4)

X
62682
0.939

1273.0
(2226.9)

-85.0
(99.0)

(4)
prop
-1625.1
(1358.5)

62682
0.757

7.512
(9.351)

-0.519
(0.629)

(5)
hyp viol
-5.134
(5.113)

X
62682
0.757

8.390
(9.477)

-0.859
(0.650)

(6)
hyp viol
-6.008
(5.400)

62682
0.725

8.820
(10.615)

-0.648
(0.723)

(7)
hyp prop
-6.606
(5.832)

X
62682
0.726

9.746
(10.758)

-1.003
(0.739)

(8)
hyp prop
-7.558
(6.188)

Notes: The dependent variables are violent and property crimes per capita. Columns 5 to 8 present results for the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformations of the crime rates. post is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines.
NonCit is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. Dem is the share of voters for the
Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effectsand
federal district and state dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. In even
columns, I include county-level controls interacted with time fixed effects. Those include share of population with a bachelor
degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

62682
0.962

-205.8
(960.8)

NonCit × Dem × post

Extra Controls
Observations
Adjusted R2

6.6
(44.4)

Dem × post

NonCit × post

(1)
viol
-142.4
(548.2)

Table B.11: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Crime Rates. Triple Difference.
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X
71637
0.917

4.534
(5.498)

-0.429
(0.366)

(2)
murders
-3.725
(3.271)

71637
0.663

-1.105
(2.582)

-0.066
(0.121)

(3)
manslaughters
1.441
(1.587)

X
71637
0.665

-1.097
(2.637)

-0.095
(0.120)

(24
manslaughters
1.398
(1.700)

Notes: The dependent variables are murders and manslaughters crimes. post is an indicator equal to one for months after
the Obama guidelines. NonCit is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. Dem is the share
of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed
effectsand federal district and state dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are weighted by 2010 population.
In even columns, I include county-level controls interacted with time fixed effects. Those include share of population with a
bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization. Standard errors clustered at county level in
parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

71637
0.915

3.700
(5.291)

NonCit × Dem × post

Extra Controls
Observations
Adjusted R2

-0.227
(0.366)

Dem × post

NonCit × post

(1)
murders
-2.953
(2.975)

Table B.12: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Murders and Manslaughters
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0.035
(0.116)
-0.400
(0.812)
11751
0.989

-0.291∗∗
(0.122)
2.052∗∗
(1.007)
11946
0.988

Dem × post

NonCit × Dem × post
1.077
(2.768)
10637
0.975

-0.250∗
(0.138)

(3)
log correct
-0.679
(1.965)

-0.051
(0.088)
11949
0.908

-0.005
(0.009)

(4)
police share
0.009
(0.052)

-0.243∗∗∗
(0.085)
11758
0.902

0.022∗
(0.012)

(5)
judicial share
0.118∗∗
(0.047)

-0.002
(0.114)
10787
0.904

-0.006
(0.010)

(6)
correct share
-0.005
(0.066)

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variables are the log of county expenditure in police, judicial and correctional. post is an indicator
equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. NonCit is the share of non citizen in a county measured with Census
2010 data. Dem is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. In all the specifications,
there are county and time fixed effectsand federal district and state dummies interacted with time dummies. Regressions are
weighted by 2010 population. Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Observations
Adjusted R2

NonCit × Dem × post

(2)
log judicial
0.337
(0.497)

(1)
log police
-1.183∗∗
(0.587)

Table B.13: Effect of Obama guidelines on expenditures
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1.373∗∗
(0.657)

(6)

64478
0.837

30037
0.844

64437
0.837

64478
0.837

64478
0.837

64478
0.850

county
common
active
non
specific
hispanic
support
baseline before
linearity noncitizen linear
guidelines noncitizen
trends

1.386∗∗∗
(0.475)

(5)

64478
0.859

hyperbolic

1.040∗∗∗
(0.323)

(7)

Notes: The dependent variable is the clearance rate of violent crimes which is the ratio of clearances (arrests) over reported
crimes. post is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. NonCit is the share of non citizen in
a county measured with Census 2010 data. Dem is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential
election. Hispan is the share of hispanic non citizen in a county measured with Census 2010 data. Dem maj is a dummy
for counties where the share of Democrat voters is higher than Republican. Standard errors clustered at county level in
parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Observations
Adjusted R2

Hispan × Dem × post

-0.104
(0.217)

1.232∗
(0.656)

Dem maj × NonCit × post

1.109∗∗∗
(0.364)

(4)

-0.015
(0.014)

1.467∗∗∗
(0.415)

1.105∗∗∗
(0.362)

(3)

Dem maj × post

NonCit × Dem × post

(2)

(1)

Table B.14: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Clearance Rate for Violent crimes. Specification Tests.
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64478
0.837

-0.000
(0.000)

64452
0.837

-0.002
(0.066)

(2)
clearance violent
1.107∗∗∗
(0.361)

59325
0.840

-0.009∗
(0.005)

(3)
clearance violent
1.145∗∗∗
(0.368)

-0.002
(0.015)
64478
0.837

(4)
clearance violent
1.099∗∗∗
(0.350)

Notes: The dependent variable is the clearance rate of violent crimes which is the ratio of clearances (arrests) over reported
crimes. post is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. NonCit is the share of non citizen in
a county measured with Census 2010 data. Dem is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential
election. Officers is the log number of police sworn officers. Bartik is the Bartik shock as defined in text. E-Verify
Enrolled is the log number of firms enrolled in E-Verify in that county. 287g is a dummy for a county ever participating
in the 287g program. Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Observations
Adjusted R2

287g × post

E-Verify enrolled

Bartik

Officers

NonCit × Dem × post

(1)
clearance violent
1.031∗∗∗
(0.381)

Table B.15: Effect of Obama Guidelines on Clearance Rate for Violent Crimes. Alternative Explanations.
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14316
0.342

-0.309∗∗∗
(0.066)

(3)
total

24276
0.432

24276
0.362

-0.008 -0.067∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.012)

(2)
federal

32476
0.341

0.078∗∗∗
(0.016)

(4)
clearance viol

36058
0.912

13.308
(12.252)

(5)
crime viol

32906
0.441

0.030∗∗∗
(0.007)

(6)
clearance prop

36058
0.848

-7.289
(28.166)

(7)
crime prop

Notes: The dependent variable is the clearance rate of violent crimes which is the ratio of clearances (arrests) over reported
crimes. CA is a dummy for counties in California. Post Trust is an indicator equal to one for months after the California
Trust Act. In all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects and a county specific linear time trend. Regressions
are weighted by 2010 population. Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Observations
Adjusted R2

CA × Post Trust

(1)
local

Table B.16: Effect of Trust Act on Enforcement, Policing and Crime
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-0.095
(0.093)
65348
0.800

-0.122
(0.096)
65348
0.801

9.60
(6.68)
71637
0.677

10.03
(6.69)
71637
0.678

-4.42
(3.90)

16.12
(17.66)

(6)
violent
crimes

9.33
(7.36)
71637
0.650

-2.34
(3.89)

14.02
(21.32)

(7)
prop
crimes

9.67
(7.34)
71637
0.651

-3.46
(4.22)

19.16
(18.92)

(8)
prop
crimes

Notes: The dependent variable is the clearance rate of violent crimes which is the ratio of clearances (arrests) over reported
crimes. CA is a dummy for counties in California. Trust is an indicator equal to one for months after the California Trust
Act. post is an indicator equal to one for months after the Obama guidelines. NonCit is the share of non citizen in a county
measured with Census 2010 data. Dem is the share of voters for the Democratic Party in the 2008 presidential election. In
all the specifications, there are county and time fixed effects, a county specific linear time trend and federal district and state
dummies interacted with time dummies. In even columns, I include county-level controls interacted with time dummies.
Those include share of population with a bachelor degree, share of the services industry and a measure of urbanization.
Regressions are weighted by 2010 population. Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01

Observations
Adjusted R2

0.296∗∗
(0.137)
64478
0.878

0.340∗∗∗
(0.131)
64478
0.878

-3.26
(3.61)

NonCit × CA × Trust

0.189∗∗
(0.087)

-0.004
(0.092)

-0.025
(0.086)

NonCit × Trust

0.167∗∗
(0.082)

10.84
(19.193)

0.399
(0.262)

0.488∗∗∗
(0.184)

1.299∗∗
(0.599)

NonCit × Dem × post

1.185∗
(0.625)

(5)
violent
crimes

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
clearance
clearance
clearance clearance
property property
violent
violent

Table B.17: Effect of Trust Act on Policing and Crime. Triple Difference.
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Figure B.1: Non-Border Removals by Year
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Figure B.2: Local Policies (September 2014)
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Figure B.3: Different Types of Enforcement by Quarter
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Red line: Obama guidelines. Green line: Trust Act Average weighted by 2010
population of counties enrolled in Secure Communities before May 2010.
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Figure B.4: Clearance rate for violent crimes
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Figure B.5: Clearance rate for property crimes
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Figure B.6: Clearance rate for violent crimes. Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
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Figure B.7: Clearance rate for property crimes. Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
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Figure B.8: Event Studies Estimates for Clearance Rate of Violent Crimes
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Notes: The graph shows coefficients (95% confidence intervals) on interactions between the non citizen share, democratic share and the Obama guidelines. The
specification includes county fixed effects, district and state dummies intereacted
with time fixed effects. Interaction with one quarter before the policy is omitted
to identify the model. Specification is weighted by 2010 county population. The
vertical line is the the quarter right before the policy change, April-June 2011.
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